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ABSTRACT
Compartmentalizing access to content, be it websites accessed in a browser or docu-
ments and applications accessed outside the browser, is an established method for protect-
ing information integrity [12, 19, 21, 60]. Compartmentalization solutions change the user
experience, introduce performance overhead and provide varying degrees of security. Strik-
ing a balance between usability and security is not an easy task. If the usability aspects are
neglected or sacrificed in favor of more security, the resulting solution would have a hard
time being adopted by end-users. The usability is affected by factors including (1) the gen-
erality of the solution in supporting various applications, (2) the type of changes required,
(3) the performance overhead introduced by the solution, and (4) how much the user expe-
rience is preserved. The security is affected by factors including (1) the attack surface of
the compartmentalization mechanism, and (2) the security decisions offloaded to the user.
This dissertation evaluates existing solutions based on the above factors and presents two
novel compartmentalization solutions that are arguably more practical than their existing
counterparts.
The first solution, called FlexICon, is an attractive alternative in the design space of
compartmentalization solutions on the desktop. FlexICon allows for the creation of a large
number of containers with small memory footprint and low disk overhead. This is achieved
by using lightweight virtualization based on Linux namespaces. FlexICon uses two mech-
anisms to reduce user mistakes: 1) a trusted file dialog for selecting files for opening and
launching it in the appropriate containers, and 2) a secure URL redirection mechanism that
detects the user’s intent and opens the URL in the proper container. FlexICon also provides
a language to specify the access constraints that should be enforced by various containers.
The second solution called Auto-FBI, deals with web-based attacks by creating multi-
ple instances of the browser and providing mechanisms for switching between the browser
i
instances. The prototype implementation for Firefox and Chrome uses system call interpo-
sition to control the browser’s network access. Auto-FBI can be ported to other platforms
easily due to simple design and the ubiquity of system call interposition methods on all
major desktop platforms.
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
Websites are vulnerable to Cross-Site Request Forgery (CSRF) [8], Cross-Site Scripting
(XSS) [44] and Clickjacking [5] attacks [55]. There are specific solutions for each of these
attacks, however, the solutions must be implemented by each website separately and are
often tricky to implement correctly [77]. A major concern for users is that they do not
know if adequate security measures are implemented for a website while they need to trust
websites with sensitive information.
This concern is further compounded by the fact that the user can download content that
might be malicious or the websites themselves might install content on the user’s machine
without the user’s knowledge. Once this content executes on the user’s machine, it can
access user data without explicit user permission due to the access control model used in
desktop systems. In all major desktop operating systems, a program is executed on behalf
of the user who launches it inheriting all access privileges afforded to that user. Most of
the time, the broad access privileges available to programs are not necessary and can cause
security problems [1, 53, 62, 75, 76].
Researchers have proposed approaches to dealing with these concerns. Approaches
that are restricted to combating CSRF, XSS and Clickjacking attacks include [8, 19, 21, 23,
39, 44, 57, 72, 73]. The existing solutions either need to be implemented by each website
separately [8, 23, 39, 44, 57, 72, 73] or require websites to opt in and entail major changes
in the browser code base [19, 21].
Other works [12, 60] propose compartmentalization to reduce the harm that can result
from malicious content. The central idea is to break down the monolithic execution envi-
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ronment of the operating system into multiple isolated execution environments (henceforth
called containers) with limited access to user data and other system resources. If an at-
tacker manages to run malicious code in one of these containers, the rest of the system is
safe from damage. Although the key idea of system compartmentalization is simple, an
actual solution requires making trade-offs between security and usability. The existing so-
lutions, namely Qubes OS [60] and Bromium [12], represent two distinct points in this
design space.
Bromium is a commercial system for Microsoft Windows based on the Xen hypervisor
that supports the creation of light-weight virtual machines (called MicroVMs) for specific
applications. Qubes is an open source project for providing virtual machines on top of the
Xen hypervisor.
Bromium can support isolation with little effect on the user experience for a handful
of commonly-used applications. For the web browser, Bromium provides isolation at the
tab level and the user has essentially the same browsing experience. The user experience is
slightly affected when editing and viewing documents (for instance if twoWord documents
are in different virtual machines, one cannot use the switch windows option to switch be-
tween the two documents). This ability to minimally affect the user experience is achieved
by modifying the applications. Qubes on the other hand does not modify the applications
and if one wishes two tabs to be isolated, one would need two separate instances of the
browser in different containers (called AppVMs). Qubes requires the user to decide in
which container particular content should be viewed whereas, for supported applications,
Bromium relieves the user from making such decisions (for the most part). Qubes provides
the ability to color the border of the application window with a color associated with its
container, but the user is ultimately responsible for keeping track of the various containers.
The advantages of Bromium come at a cost. Qubes disk access overhead and network over-
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head are better than those of Bromium. On the other hand, Bromium can support hundreds
of isolation containers whereas Qubes can support a little more than a dozen containers,
but Qubes’ security is arguably better than that of Bromium1. A solution with low per-
formance overhead which does not modify applications and can compartmentalize all user
applications must be possible.
This dissertation presents two approaches to dealing with attacks on desktop systems
that are enabled by monolithic execution environments, including web-based attacks such
as CSRF, XSS and Clickjacking and attacks outside the browser that rely on executing
malicious code on the victim’s machine. One approach is limited in scope but is easily
portable to all major desktop platforms, the other approach is more comprehensive and
presents a novel design in the space of system compartmentalization solutions.
The first approach, called Auto-FBI, deals with web-based attacks by creating multiple
instances of the browser and providing mechanisms for switching between the browser
instances. A prototype implementation of this design is presented for Firefox and Chrome
on Ubuntu which uses system call interposition techniques to control the browser’s network
access and enforce a Chinese wall policy [11] on websites that can be accessed by browser
instances. Auto-FBI can be ported to other platforms easily due to simple design and the
ubiquity of system call interposition methods on all major desktop platforms.
The second approach, called FlexICon, presents an attractive alternative in the design
space of compartmentalization solutions on the desktop. The main design goals for FlexI-
Con are: (1) no modification to applications, (2) high performance, (3) reducing the effects
of user mistakes, and (4) security. The first design goal means that, like Qubes, FlexICon
would modify the user experience, in particular the browsing experience. Unlike Qubes,
1It should be noted that some of the overhead in Bromium can be due to other functionality it provides
for monitoring purposes
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Table 1. Comparing FlexICon, Qubes and Bromium
Aspect FlexICon Qubes Bromium
Large number of containers 3 7 3
Fast container launch 3 7 ?
Fast application launch 3 3 3
Low disk overhead 3 7 7
Low network overhead 3 3 7
Cooperative 3 7 N/A
Mitigates human error 3 7 3
Requires no application modification 3 3 7
Minimal change to user experience 7 7 3
Platform Attack Surface
FlexICon Full kernel API
Qubes Hypervisor + disaggregated restricted kernel API
Bromium Hypervisor + restricted kernel API
FlexICon allows for the creation of a large number of containers with small memory foot-
print. The disk and network overhead of FlexICon are better than those of Qubes and
Bromium. This is achieved by using lightweight virtualization based on Linux namespaces.
To reduce the effects of user mistakes and the effects of the design on the browsing expe-
rience, FlexICon uses two mechanisms: 1) A trusted file dialog that allows applications
running in any container to select a file for opening and launching it in the appropriate
container, and 2) it provides seamless transitions between browser instances in various con-
tainers using a browser extension that reports all user-requested URLs to the system so that
if the URL must be handled by a browser running in a different container, the system can
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detect user’s intent and open the URL in the proper container. FlexICon also provides a
language that allows a savvy user to specify the access constraints that should be enforced
by various containers. A summary of the comparison of FlexICon to Qubes and Bromium
is shown in Table 1.
Overall, FlexICon has better performance compared to Qubes and Bromium, is more
general compared to Bromium in terms of application support, makes less changes to user
experience compared toQubes, reduces error-prone security decisions by the user at runtime
compared to Qubes, but has a larger attack surface compared to Qubes and Bromium.
1.1 Contributions
This dissertation has the following contributions:
(a) It presents Auto-FBI, an easily portable solution for isolating access to sensitive web-
sites that does not require changing the browser code base or cooperation from web-
site owners.
(b) It presents a comprehensive evaluation of existing system compartmentalization so-
lutions in terms of performance and security.
(c) It presents FlexICon, a system compartmentalization solution that represents a new
point in the design space of system compartmentalization solutions with unique trade-
offs between performance, security and usability.
(d) It presents an implementation of FlexICon for Ubuntu using light-weight isolation
containers that can create large number of containers and achieve low performance
overhead compared to existing systems.
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1.2 Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows:
• Chapter 2 explores the related work.
• Chapter 3 presents Auto-FBI, a limited scope solution for securing access to sensitive
content on the web.
• Chapter 4 presents FlexICon, a comprehensive compartmentalization solution for
desktop systems.
• Chapter 5 provides a detailed comparison of Bromium, Qubes and FlexICon.
• Chapter 6 provides conclusions and future work.
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Chapter 2
RELATED WORK
This chapter explores related work in the following areas: (1) web-specific solutions,
(2) compartmentalization solutions, (3) isolation techniques, (4) secure graphical user inter-
faces, and (5) access control.
2.1 Web-specific Solutions
Existing techniques for combating CSRF, XSS and Clickjacking attacks require each
website to implement these measures individually. Content Security Policy (CSP) [72]
allows the website developer to specify origins that are allowed to load in the context of
a web page as well as putting restrictions on loading a page inside frames. Origin and
Referer header validation [8] can be used to determine the origin of a request. SameSite
cookies [73] prevent the browser from sending the cookie with cross-site requests. CSRF
tokens [57, 77] can be used to mitigate CSRF attacks.
Researchers have proposed isolating web applications in a single browser to combat
CSRF, XSS and Clickjacking attacks [19]. The website providers can signal the browser
using the host-meta mechanism [36] to isolate their website. Implementing the isolation
mechanism in the browser requires non-trivial changes to the code base of the browser
which means that major browsers are not likely to adopt this method. A benefit of this
approach is that it can be fine-grained beyond isolating entire origins.
Tahoma [21] provides a browser operating system (BOS), a software layer on top of
which web browsers can run. The BOS employs the Xen hypervisor to compartmentalize
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each web application in a Xen domain. The policy, including code to run, web domains
to allow access to, and web application’s identity is specified by the web provider. This
approach requires major changes to the browser to be able to run on top of the BOS.
FlowFox [25] implements information flow control for web scripts based on the secure
multi-execution technique. A modified version of SpiderMonkey, the JavaScript engine
used in Firefox and other browsers, is used to enforce information flow security policies.
FlowFox can be used to prevent information leakage by web scripts.
2.2 Compartmentalization Solutions
This section discusses the following categories of compartmentalization solutions: (1)
application compartmentalization, (2) content-based compartmentalization, and (3) system
compartmentalization.
2.2.1 Application Compartmentalization
Complex applications such as web browsers can be a major attack vector on desktop
platforms enabling malware to find its way on the system. In order to defend against these
attacks, a large complex application might be broken into multiple smaller components that
execute with minimal privileges necessary to do their job. There are specific examples of
applying this technique in the literature such as [7] as well as software frameworks that
make it easier to apply this idea such as [71]. Although this could reduce the damage to the
system in case the fortified application is attacked, ransomware and other types of malicious
programs are not prevented by this method.
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2.2.2 Content-based Compartmentalization
Information flow tracking and data provenance have been used to decide how to isolate
processes. SPIF [68] is a system developed for Microsoft Windows that prevents untrusted
applications from modifying system resources. It can prevent malware from becoming
persistent on the victim’s system since most malware targeting Microsoft Windows make
themselves persistent across reboots by modifying certain system components. However,
SPIF does not protect user’s data from being modified by malware.
Shadow execution is a technique proposed by Capizzi et al. [13] to prevent desktop ap-
plications from leaking user data over the network. Two copies of the same program are
executed in separate virtual machines, a private copy with no network access and a pub-
lic copy with no access to user data. The responses received by the public copy over the
network is then shared with the private copy to provide network functionalities such as pro-
gram updates. This approach can only be used to protect confidentiality and cannot be used
to protect user data against damage by malicious code. Additionally, the implementation
suffers from high performance overhead.
In ServiceOS [54], applications and data are labeled based on their origin and processes
are isolated based on these labels. The resulting system ismore or less similar to theAndroid
model in which every application has its own security principal. This approach requires
changing applications to use a different programming model. ServiceOS also requires a
custom HTTP header to be fully functional.
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2.2.3 System Compartmentalization
Qubes [60] is an open source Linux-based operating system that uses Xen virtualization.
Device drivers that might be vulnerable to attacks can be executed in their own dedicated
virtual machines. It is also possible to create AppVMs which are user-managed virtual ma-
chine that can be dedicated to any task(s). The user needs to be vigilant to benefit from
AppVMs. For example, the user needs to be constantly aware not to access unknown web-
sites in the AppVM dedicated for online banking. Moreover, the memory overhead of full
virtualization is high and booting AppVMs is slow.
Bromium [12] is a commercial product for Microsoft Windows that also employs Xen-
based virtualization to create MicroVMs to isolate various tasks. A task in Bromium can
be a single browser tab or a PDF viewer displaying a file. The MicroVM only provides
minimal access for processes. Bromium uses patented technology to reduce memory over-
head of VMs when running supported applications. Unsupported applications still cause
a large memory overhead when executed in a VM. To achieve this level of isolation (for
instance isolating browser tabs in separate MicroVMs) and reduce the memory overhead
of full virtualization, Bromium relies on heavy modifications to applications. Additionally,
the user has the following options when it comes to applications that are not supported by
Bromium: (1) either trust the application with complete access to the host or (2) restrict it
to a high overhead virtual environment with no access to any files on the host.
Polaris [67] is a prototype for Windows XP that allows the user to run applications in
restricted mode by running them with a restricted user account. It also implements Power-
Box, a trusted file dialog that can show all user files and once the user selects a file, it gives
access to the file to the confined application. The confinement method used in Polaris does
not prevent applications from communicating or spying on other applications.
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2.3 Isolation Techniques
Virtualization and sandboxing techniques have been used to provide isolation for dif-
ferent purposes. Virtualization techniques can be categorized in two broad categories: (a)
full virtualization such as Xen [49] and VMware ESXi [16], (b) light-weight virtualization
(sometimes called OS virtualization) such as OpenVZ [56] and LXC [48]. Full virtual-
ization systems provide the ability to run multiple heterogeneous operating systems on a
single machine which is desirable for server consolidation and improving hardware uti-
lization [69]. Light-weight virtualization systems have some limitations in that regard, for
instance one cannot run Microsoft Windows in OpenVZ. However, light-weight virtualiza-
tion techniques incur less overhead and offer better performance [17].
Device namespaces [3] complement Linux namespaces [10] for Android platform and
provide virtualization for all device drivers. These techniques have been used to extend the
Android OS to provide virtualization for smart-phones [3].
Different sandboxing methods [30, 33, 45, 70, 74] exist for desktop platforms that are
used to fight malware [35] by containing unknown applications to a virtual and limited en-
vironment. Google Chrome uses sandboxing techniques to isolate its rendering engine [7].
Adobe Reader X and Internet Explorer also use sandboxing techniques for similar pur-
poses [35].
2.4 Secure Graphical User Interfaces
Window systems serve as the mediator of user input and output and provide interpro-
cess communication (IPC) for client applications. Widely used systems like the X window
system [61] have outdated trust assumptions. They are based on the assumption that all ap-
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plications are friendly and the window system should encourage and facilitate cooperation
between client applications. Trusted Window Systems [26, 29, 64] try to solve the security
issues that arise when these assumptions do not hold, i.e. modern computing environment.
Isolation is a key principle: client applications should not be able to spy on each other. User
intent traceability is also an important factor in designing a trusted window system. Prevent-
ing applications from eavesdropping on user input and preventing denial of service attacks
on the GUI system are also addressed by such systems. The EROS TrustedWindow System
(EWS) was developed from scratch to create a new window system with security features
in mind [64]. Some solutions try to be compatible with the X window system as much as
possible [27, 28, 29]. The Trusted X (TX) [28] system has the additional goal of retrofitting
X to provide a multi level security (MLS) scheme for the window system with minimal ef-
fects on X applications. The work also introduces a novel windows labeling scheme (on all
sides) to ensure that users are aware of the window security level. Nitpicker [29] remains
compatible with X applications while achieving a limited set of security goals in 1500 lines
of code.
2.5 Access Control
2.5.1 Usable Access Control
The strategy of security by designation integrates security decisions with the user’s
primary task [75]. The idea is to grant authorities to programs based on user actions, e.g.
when the user selects a file to open, the system would grant read access to that file to the
program. Examples of applying security by designation in the literature include Access
Control Gadgets for Android [59], and Polaris [67].
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Access Control Gadgets (ACGs) provide user interfaces for system resources such as the
camera, that grant access permission to applications that embed these interfaces when the
user naturally interacts with the interface [59]. A requirement of this approach is a system
that executes applications with limited privileges. Mobile platforms such as Android and
iOS provide such execution models while desktop operating systems do not.
2.5.2 Capability Systems
In systems that use the access control lists mechanism, a process is normally executed
on behalf of a user inheriting all privileges of that user. This has been described as the ambi-
ent authoritymodel [53, 71]. Although it is theoretically possible to consider every process
a separate subject for ACL, practical considerations dictate that the list of subjects be kept
more or less static and small. On the other hand, capability systems [47, 63] use capability
lists which allow for more fine-grained control over the privileges of a process [53]. How-
ever, capability lists require a different programming API and existing applications need to
be modified in order to work on a capability system.
Capsicum [71] provides capabilities for Unix-like operating systems. It can be used to
break large applications into smaller pieces that run in sandboxes and use capabilities for
accessing system resources. This approach is very promising in bridging the gap between
ACL-based systems and capability systems. However, only the programs that leverage the
new Capsicum API benefit from it.
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Chapter 3
SECURING ACCESS TO SENSITIVE CONTENT ON THE WEB
This chapter describes Auto-FBI, a novel and simple approach for securing access to
sensitive content on the web. The approach automates the best manual compartmental-
ization practices for accessing different kinds of content with multiple browser instances.
The automation is transparent to the user and does not require any modification of how
non-sensitive content is accessed. For sensitive content, a Fresh Browser Instance (FBI) is
automatically created to access the content. Auto-FBI can provide support for novice users
with predefined sensitive-content sites as well as for more experienced users who can define
conflict of interest (COI) classes which allows content from sites in the same user-defined
class to coexist in a browser instance. Performance evaluation of Auto-FBI shows that the
overhead introduced by the approach is acceptable (less than 160 ms for sites that already
have fast load time, but for slow sites the overhead can be as high as 750 ms).
3.1 Existing Approaches
Attack vectors targeting web applications are possible due to a combination of factors:
a) web standards are very permissive in terms of cross-site interactions, b) cross-site re-
quests usually carry authenticating tokens such as session id cookies, c) determining the
true origin of a request and whether or not the user knowingly initiated the request is not
straightforward on the server side, d) sanitizing user inputs correctly is very tricky [77].
Existing techniques for combating CSRF, XSS and Clickjacking attacks are discussed
in Section 2.1. A shortcoming of these methods (CSP, SameSite cookies, Origin and Ref-
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erer header validation, CSRF tokens) is that they need to be implemented for each website
separately. Moreover, the evolving nature of the web, lack of universal browser support for
newer methods such as CSP and SameSite cookies, filtering of the Referer HTTP headers
due to privacy concerns and other complicating factors make it difficult to reliably eliminate
these attack vectors.
A common security advice for users is to use at least two browsers to surf the web, one
for sensitive sites, and one for other purposes [14, 57, 66]. The main reason given for this
advice is usually the following. “Using multiple browsers can minimize the chances that a
vulnerability in a particular web browser, website, or related software can be used to com-
promise sensitive information” [14]. Following this advice in practice is error-prone and
cumbersome especially for novice users, but it demonstrates the need for compartmental-
ization of web access.
3.2 An Alternative Approach
A simple and practical solution would be to automate the best practice of using multiple
browsers by creating multiple browser instances2 and providing mechanisms for switching
between multiple browser windows to reduce the burden on the user. Auto-FBI implements
this approach. It works by launching a fresh browser instance (FBI) whenever the current
browser instance should not be used to access the requested content.
Auto-FBI provides two usage models, one for novice users and one for savvy users.
The usage model for novice users is simple. In this model there are two kinds of websites:
sensitive and non-sensitive. Websites are classified in one of these two classes by listing
2A browser instance is a combination of the browser code and state, including browsing history, cookies,
cache, saved passwords, etc.
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sensitive sites in a configuration file. The user normally interacts with the default browser
instance that is associated with non-sensitive sites. Once the user tries to navigate to a
sensitive site in the non-sensitive instance, a new browser instance is created and a new
window from that browser instance opens to handle the request. To emphasize that the
window is only meant for navigating one site, the address bar, menus and tabs are disabled
in the new window.
Experienced users can define more than two classes of websites and can control the type
of browser (Firefox or Chrome) to use in each case. Each class of websites is essentially
a conflict of interest (COI) class and Auto-FBI enforces a Chinese wall policy [11] by al-
lowing websites that belong to the same COI class to co-exist in the same browser instance
but preventing websites belonging to different COI classes from co-existing in the same
browser instance. To allow for infrastructure sites such as certificate authorities that need
to be accessible in all browser instances, Auto-FBI allows experienced users to list such
domains separately and allows all browser instances to access them.
COI classes are specified by listing websites that should be allowed to co-exist in the
same browser instance. An implicit general class captures websites that are not listed in
any other class. The user normally interacts with the default browser instance associated
with the general COI class. If the user tries to navigate to a websites that is not allowed
in the current browser instance, a new browser instance is created (if one does not exist
already) and Auto-FBI opens the requested website in that browser instance and brings
the window to focus. The original browser instance is prevented from loading the website.
Auto-FBI redirects the request from the original browser instance to a local page showing
a message to the user that the site will be opened in another browser instance. The browser
extension can automatically close this page to reduce clutter if desired. Figure 1 shows an
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Figure 1. A request is made to www.bankofamerica.com in the general browser
instance. Instead of displaying the requested page in the current instance, Auto-FBI
displays a message (top image) and opens the requested site in a fresh browser instance
(bottom image).
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example where the original browser instance is showing a message from Auto-FBI and a
new browser instance is loading the requested page in novice user mode.
3.3 System & Threat Model
3.3.1 System Model
This section identifies the relevant components of the system. The system consists of
a client side and a server side. Web clients typically run in web browsers. Web browsers
retrieve web content delivered by web servers. Web servers and web content have origins
associated with them. An origin is considered a principal (whether or not it is authenticated).
Web content is acted upon by the web browser. Content might be active which requires
the browser to execute some code to process it. A browser that processes content from
a given origin is considered a delegate of the origin. Web content is retrieved using web
queries. A query can be a simple query that specifies the address of the content in the
form of a URL (uniform resource locator) which consists of a domain name and file path
or an active query that consists of the above and parameters that are passed to server-side
code that use the parameters to process the query. A web server might require credentials
from a web browser in order to authenticate the principal requesting queries. Credentials
are typically provided when initial access is requested, typically in the form of a user id
and password. Once credentials are approved, a cookie is stored by the browser to be used
for future authentication. At that point the browser acts as a delegate of the authenticated
principal.
An instance of a web browser is a software process (or a group of related processes) that
executes the browser code and has associated with it a profile which includes information
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such as preferences, browsing history, cookies, bookmarks, and saved passwords. A profile
captures an execution state of the browser. When a browser exits, some information might
be deleted from the profile, non persistent cookies for example, but other information in the
profile is saved. When a browser is restarted after exiting, the profile provides continuity
between the old browser process and the new process.
3.3.2 Threat Model
Given that a browser instance can be processing content from different sources, and
therefore is a delegate for these sources, it is important that these various roles do not get
mixed together in the browser. For example, a script running in a browser on behalf of
one source should not be able in general to read data associated with another source in the
browser – such as passwords being entered in a form. Such restrictions are expressed as
security policies and are enforced by the browser. Unfortunately, given the great flexibility
provided by the browser, scripts have the ability to obtain information indirectly through
attempted access to forbidden resources and to communicate directly and indirectly with
their origins. This flexibility makes it hard to enforce policies and even when policies are
correctly enforced, theymight still allow undesired behavior. SameOrigin Policy (SOP) [6]
is an example of a policy that can be circumvented rather easily [43]. In general, a security
policy restricts what actions can be done by the various system processes. Abstractly, one
can think of a policy as a set of allowed system executions. A policy for a web browser
expresses what executions of the browser are allowed and which executions are not allowed
as seen by an external observer. In other words, a policy on a web browser is a restriction
on the input/output behavior of the browser.
A browser is susceptible to an attack relative to a security policy if some browser execu-
19
tions do not satisfy the security policy. The attacks are not defined in terms of the specific
technical modalities to achieve them, but in terms of what can be achieved. In general, an
attack requires the browser to get and process content from one or more origins. The fol-
lowing description of attacks assumes that there are at least three classes of origin: HIGH,
LOW and AUTH (authenticated). It is also assumed that LOW and HIGH are disjoint. The
following are attack models that are considered in this chapter.
1. Information Leakage (Leakage): An attacker is able to launch an information leakage
attack if a LOW origin is able to receive content from a HIGH origin through the
browser.
2. Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF): An attacker is able to launch a CSRF attack if
requests to an AUTH origin to which the browser is already authenticated depends
on content from a different origin.
3. Clickjacking (UI Redress): UI redress attack is similar to CSRF attack, but requires
user participation by interacting with user interface elements. It is typically achieved
by exploiting features of the user interface to let a user interact with a target website
when they think that they are interacting with other content.
The way the attacks are described does not necessarily follow the way they are typically
described in the literature, but it is a more general description that emphasizes the attacks
capabilities rather than the minutiae of the attack mechanisms.
In this chapter it is assumed that a browser cannot be compromised in a way that enables
it to access system resources it is not supposed to access. For example, the browser will not
arbitrarily read and write files it is not supposed to access.
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3.4 Design & Implementation
The desired functionalities can be achieved using two mechanisms: an enforcer mech-
anism and an enabler mechanism. The enforcer mechanism prevents the browser instance
from communicating with web origins that are not in its COI class. The enabler mechanism
starts browser instances as needed.
3.4.1 Design Alternatives
There are three ways to design the enforcement mechanism: (a) inside the browser
by modifying the browser code, (b) as a browser extension, (c) outside the browser. The
following is a brief discussion of these option:
• Enforcement inside the browser: The desired functionality could be provided by
modifying the browser to add the desired enforcement rules. This approach is highly
browser-dependent and requires detailed understanding of the browser’s code to be
implemented. It requires different implementations for different browsers. Since
this approach does not provide a clean separation between the browser’s code and
the enforcement mechanism, it is not recommended.
• Enforcement in a browser extension: Providing the desired enforcement as a
browser extension is an improvement over enforcement inside the browser. In a
browser like Chrome, extensions can be a combination of JavaScript and native code
that is controlled by JavaScript. This approach is also not advisable because the
JavaScript engine is potentially exposed to malicious scripts from various sources.
Any compromise of the engine through such malicious scripts can also compromise
the enforcement mechanism.
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• Enforcement outside the browser: Enforcement outside the browser can be
achieved by intercepting the browser’s system calls and only allowing those calls
that are according to policy. This has the advantage of separating the enforcement
mechanism from the browser’s code. It also obviates the need to make additional
restrictive assumptions about the power of the attacker. Enforcement outside the
browser does not preclude implementing part of the enabler mechanism inside the
browser.
Auto-FBI follows the third design option for the enforcement mechanism. The enabler
mechanism is also mainly outside the browser, however, a browser extension is used to
report user-requested URLs to the enabler mechanism running outside the browser.
3.4.2 System Design
Auto-FBI has two main components: the enforcer and the enabler. Each browser in-
stance runs inside an enforcer which controls the system calls made by the browser to ensure
that the browser instance can only access websites in its COI class. The enabler determines
when it is necessary to launch a new browser instance to handle a user request based on the
system configuration.
3.4.2.1 The Enforcer
The enforcer uses system call interposition techniques to control the browser’s network
access. When the browser issues a system call, the enforcer is notified by the operating
system. If the system call is not relevant to network access, the enforcer does not change
anything. Otherwise, it might change values returned from the operating system. This tech-
22
nique is used to rewrite DNS responses when the browser instance is not allowed to access
the target website domain. If a DNS response message resolves the IP address of a website
that is not allowed in the controlled browser instance, the enforcer changes the IP address
in the message to the loop-back IP address which prevents the browser instance from ob-
taining the IP address of the target website. If the controlled browser instance is allowed
to access the target website, the enforcer stores the IP address found in the DNS message
in a white-list. System call interposition is also used to prevent the browser instance from
connecting to IP addresses that are not in the enforcer’s white-list.
The IP addresses used by the browser are not always preceded by DNS queries. In
fact for security reasons, IP addresses obtained from DNS queries are typically cached
by browsers even if the time to live (TTL) field is set to zero in the DNS response (IP
pinning [42]). There are three kinds of IP addresses that can be used by a browser:
• IP addresses that are cached by the browser and obtained from a previous DNS query.
The enforcer stores IP addresses that are obtained through DNS queries in a white-
list for websites that are allowed to be accessed in the controlled browser instance. A
later use of such an IP address is compared against the white-list. If the IP address is
not on the list, the connection is blocked by the enforcer.
• Browser hard-coded IP addresses. Auto-FBI does not allow the use of any hard-coded
IP addresses by the browser. Hard-coded addresses are considered suspicious and a
security risk.
• Hand-coded IP addresses. IP addresses that are directly entered by the user have legit-
imate usages such as setting up some LAN services (WiFi router setup for example).
Such usages should be allowed. As a policy one can allow some LAN IP addresses
and associate a COI class with each allowed address.
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Figure 2. Execution scenario for handling access to content from a different COI class
It is interesting to note that associating a separate COI class with LAN addresses can
prevent DNS rebinding attacks which are not completely solved by DNS pinning [42].
Figure 2 illustrates a scenario in which a browser instance is trying to access a website
whose COI class is different from that of the browser instance. First the browser makes a
DNS query to resolve the IP address (1,2,3), the DNS response is detected by the enforcer
(4) and the requested domain name is checked against the list of COI classes (5). Since the
browser instance is associated with a different class, the enforcer rewrites the IP address in
the DNS response (6) and returns the result to the browser. The browser would not have
access to the actual IP address for www.bank.com and hence it is not able to connect to
it. Even if the browser somehow obtained the IP address for www.bank.com, it would
not be able to connect to the website because the IP address of the website is not added to
the white-list of the enforcer controlling it.
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3.4.2.2 The Enabler
To manage browser instances running in the system and launching new instances, a
daemon keeps track of all browser instances. To detect user-requested URLs, a browser
extension in each browser instance communicates with the enabler daemon and reports all
user-requested URLs to the daemon. When the enabler daemon detects a user request that
cannot be satisfied in the reporting browser instance, it launches a new browser instance if
needed and asks the browser extension running in the new instance to open the URL in a
new tab.
Executing part of the enabler mechanism inside the browser does not affect the security
of Auto-FBI. If the browser extension is compromised, all that would be affected is the
URL communicated by the extension, but that has no effect on the tracing of system calls
and blocking them which is enforced through a mechanism that is completely outside the
browser. So, compromising the browser extension might affect the progress requirement
of the browser, but does not affect the safety requirements of the enforcement.
3.4.3 Implementation Details
Auto-FBI was implemented for 64-bit Linux with browser extensions developed for
Firefox and Chrome. It uses the Linux ptrace API [50] for system call interposition.
Auto-FBI fully runs in user-space and no kernel modification is necessary. The components
running outside the browser (the enforcer and the enabler daemon) are implemented in 2642
lines of C. The browser extension for Firefox is written in 133 lines of JavaScript and 139
lines of C and the browser extension for Chrome is written in 188 lines of JavaScript and
130 lines of C. Figure 3 shows the system architecture.
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Figure 3. Auto-FBI system architecture
3.4.3.1 Enforcer
Using Linux ptrace API, one can trace every system call made by a child process
to keep track of the child process’s access to system resources including network and file
system. There are two options for a tracer to start tracing the tracee: (a) TRACEME, (b)
ATTACH. The first option is usually used in the following way: the tracer forks a new
child process and in the child process calls ptrace() with TRACEME command, which
causes the child process to be traceable by its parent process (the tracer), then the child
process runs the target program using exec(). The second option can be used to trace an
already-running process by attaching to it.
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The enforcer uses the TRACEME option by default, but in order to support Chrome’s
use of SETUID binaries, the enforcer uses the ATTACH option for tracing Chrome3.
Using the ATTACH method leaves an enforcement gap: from the time that tracer
launches Chrome until the tracer attaches to the browser, the browser is not traced. This
should not be a source of vulnerability if the default home pages are safe. Using ATTACH
means that part of the enforcer that is involved in setting up the tracing is browser dependent,
but the rest of the enforcement when theATTACH option is used and the whole enforcement
using the TRACEME option are generic and not dependent on the browser.
The ptrace API allows one to trace a process and all its child processes
and threads by specifying the following options: PTRACE_O_TRACEFORK and
PTRACE_O_TRACECLONE. Using these flags guarantees that a process cannot escape
the tracer by creating a child process or a new thread.
For every system call made by the tracee, the tracer is notified twice: once before the
call is handed over to the kernel for execution and once after the call returns from the kernel
but before it is handed back to the tracee. So the tracer has two chances to modify a system
call: it can change the parameters provided by the tracee to the kernel, or change the values
returned by the kernel. To restrict the browser’s access to websites, the following system
calls are monitored:
• connect(): Connects a socket file descriptor to a network address.
• recvfrom(): Receives data through a socket file descriptor.
3This is because the Linux kernel does not allow a non-root process to trace a process with root privileges
using the TRACEME option. Using TRACEME with Chrome would either require root privileges for running
the browser which is not desirable or it breaks the browser’s internal sandboxing mechanism which uses the
SETUID flag to allow its sandbox process to temporarily run with root privileges. The enforcer waits until
the privilege level is dropped after the sandbox is setup and then attaches to the main browser process using
the ATTACH option of ptrace.
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• read(): Can be used to receive data from the network (through a socket file de-
scriptor)
The recvfrom() and read() system calls are monitored to detect DNS queries.
If the port number4 matches the port number of the DNS protocol (53), the I/O buffer from
the tracee’s memory is read to analyze the DNS message. If the IP addresses in the DNS
message need to be changed, the tracer does so by writing to the tracee’s virtual memory5.
To prevent the browser from connecting to a restricted website by using a hard-coded
IP address, the enforcer keeps a white-list of IP addresses that the browser is allowed to
connect to. Initially, it is populated with the DNS service IP address (usually the local
DNS client, 127.0.0.1) and a list of predefined IP addresses (to allow for LAN addresses).
When the browser makes a DNS query, one of the following happens: either the response
is changed to prevent access in case the URL is not allowed, or the IP addresses in the
response are added to the white-list. When the browser issues a connect() system call,
the enforcer only allows it to go through if the target IP address is in the white-list.
Note that there are other Linux system calls [51] that are similar to read()
and recvfrom() in that they can be used to read from socket file descriptors, e.g.
recvmsg(), and those system calls can be monitored similarly to detect DNS queries.
However, the Auto-FBI prototype implementation does not include those system calls
simply because the target browsers only used read() and recvfrom() at the time
that Auto-FBI was implemented. Also note that if the tracer misses such a system call, it
would not hurt security but prevent the browser from connecting to the web.
4The /proc interface was used to figure out the remote port number of a socket. Alternatively, one can
keep track of all sockets owned by the tracee and the port number specified during the connect call, but this
method is error-prone. See [32] for a detailed discussion on why replicating the kernel state is a bad idea.
5The process_vm_readv() and process_vm_writev() system calls are used to read/write
data from/to the tracee’s virtual memory which is much more efficient than ptrace for this purpose.
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3.4.3.2 Browser Extension
The browser extension for Chrome was written using the chrome.* API and the
browser extension for Firefox was written using the Firefox Add-on SDK. Since the
JavaScript code cannot directly communicate with the enabler daemon, a native library
written in C is used to forward messages between the daemon and the JavaScript code. The
native library communicates at one end with the browser extension through the browser
API (Native Messaging API in case of Chrome and js-ctypes in case of Firefox) and on the
other end with the enabler daemon through Unix domain sockets. The native library runs
as a child process of the browser instance and hence can be considered a part of the browser
extension.
3.4.3.3 Enabler Daemon
The enabler daemon is a multi-threaded C program that uses Unix domain sockets to
communicate with browser extensions. It is responsible for deciding how to handle re-
stricted URLs by either dispatching it to an already-running instance that is allowed to
access the URL or creating a fresh new instance.
For every browser instance running in the system, the daemon has a separate thread
to communicate with the browser extension running in that browser instance. It keeps a
record for each running browser instance along with a queue of outgoing messages for that
instance in a shared data structure. When it receives a URL from a browser extension, it
compares the COI class of the URL with that of the sender. If they match, it ignores the
reported URL, otherwise it opens the URL in the proper browser instance.
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3.4.3.4 Browser Instances and User Profiles
A browser instance is associated with a profile that captures its execution state. In prac-
tice, most browsers support user profiles to enable the multi-user use case. User profiles are
very similar in different browsers: a folder stored somewhere in the user’s home directory
that contains information such as the user’s web history, cookies, cache, and preferences.
Fortunately, most browsers also provide a way of using multiple profiles for a user in addi-
tion to the user’s default profile. In case of Firefox and Chrome, creating a fresh instance
of the browser is as easy as creating an empty directory and instructing the browser to use
that directory to store the user profile (though this would be cumbersome to do manually).
In Auto-FBI, the default user profile (the one managed by the user) is associated with
the general COI class. Other COI classes do not have a persistent profile: a temporary
profile is created whenever the instance is created and it gets deleted after the instance is
closed. This way of managing user profiles is both usable and secure. User spends most of
the time using the default profile since most URLs fall into the general COI category, hence
allowing the user to manage that profile improves usability. Using temporary profiles for
other COI classes ensures tighter security without much effect on usability.
3.4.3.5 Configuration Syntax
COI classes are specified in a single text file with the following sections separated with
empty lines:
1. The first section lists domain names that should be accessible in all browser instances.
This is useful for specifying certificate authorities and other infrastructure domain
names.
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2. Subsequent sections each specify one COI class by listing domain names of websites
that belong to that COI class.
An implicit COI class, called the general COI class, captures any website that is not ex-
plicitly listed in the configuration file. Each section starts with a line that specifies the type
of browser (Firefox or Chrome) that should be used when launching a new browser instance
for that COI class. This line starts with ’>’ followed by a type descriptor character:
• ’F’: use Firefox
• ’C’: use Chrome
• ’=’: use the same browser type as the one used to make the request
• ’!’: use a different browser type from the one used to make the request
• ’_’: places no restriction on the browser type
The general COI class has the implicit type descriptor ’_’ which means that both
Firefox and Chrome can be used with the general class. Figure 4 shows an example config-
uration file. Note that lines starting with # are ignored by Auto-FBI.
The example configuration file shown in Figure 4 defines two explicit COI classes: C1
and C2. The first class C1 has type descriptor ’!’ and the second class has type descrip-
tor ’C’. To demonstrate the user experience, let’s consider the following scenario: the
user opens Chrome to start browsing, the browser starts in the general COI class. The
user can navigate to any site that is not listed in C1 or C2 in this browser instance. If
the user tries to navigate to www.bankofamerica.com which is listed in C1, a fresh
instance of Firefox will be created to handle the request. That is because the type descrip-
tor for C1 specifies that an instance with a different type from that of the browser used
to make the request (Chrome in this example) should be used. If the user tries to access
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# Certificate Authorities and other common domains
>
verisign.com
comodo.com
digicert.com
entrust.net
globalsign.com
sb-ssl.google.com
# C1: Banking
>!
americanexpress.com
aexp-static.com
aexp.demdex.net
bankofamerica.com
usbank.com
# C2: Shopping
>C
amazon.com
ebay.com
ebaystatic.com
ebayimg.com
Figure 4. Example Auto-FBI configuration file prepared by an experienced user
www.facebook.com from the Firefox instance, the request will be handled by the ex-
isting Chrome instance of the general class. That is because the general class has the implicit
type descriptor ’_’ which allows the system to use the available instance. If the user nav-
igates to www.ebay.com from any of the previous instances, a new instance of Chrome
will be launched to handle the request regardless of the browser type used to initiate the
request.
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3.5 Performance Evaluation
To measure the impact of system call interposition on the browser, the page load time
was measured using the benchmarking extension from the Chromium project [20] for 20
most-visited websites. Chromium browser version 25 was used to perform the tests. The
page load timewasmeasured when running the browser natively (Tnative) and when running
the browser with the enforcer (Tenforcer). The page load times were also measured with
and without caching. Each test scenario was repeated 50 times. The page load overhead is
calculated using the following formulas:
∆T = Tenforcer − Tnative
∆T% =
∆T
Tnative
∗ 100
Table 2 shows the experiment results and calculated overheads. The last three rows of
the table show the average over different sets of websites. Average for fast sites shows the
average for those sites that have Tnative ≤ 1000 milliseconds and Average for slow sites
shows the average for those sites with Tnative > 1000milliseconds. The last row shows the
average over all 20 websites.
Although the relative overhead is large (about 30 %), the absolute delay is not signifi-
cantly perceptible to the user. In fact for fast sites, the average overhead is less than 250
milliseconds which in absolute terms is not significantly perceptible. For slow sites, the
absolute overhead is higher, but the relative overhead is lower. While the overhead of the
initial prototype is acceptable, further improvements are needed. It should be noted that due
to variations in data transfer rates that are unavoidable, the overhead values are negative in
a few cases.
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3.6 Security Evaluation
The argument for the security of Auto-FBI is based on the fact that access to content
from one COI class is not allowed in a browser instance associated with another COI class.
This is enforced by restricting communication to IP addresses that are on the white-list for
the COI class of the executing browser instance. The IP addresses on the white-list of one
class can be one of the following: (1) IP addresses corresponding to a domain from the
common domain list, or (2) IP addresses of a domain in the COI class. So, if DNS is not
compromised, only content from sources in a given COI class can run on a browser instance
associated with that class. For sensitive content whose servers are typically authenticated
(served over HTTPS), the assumption on DNS not being compromised is not needed and
the system provides the desired isolation that ensures that there is no leakage of sensitive
content between various instances (assuming the authentication mechanism is secure). This
means that attacks such as CSRF or Clickjacking cannot be used to access sensitive content.
In fact, websites used to launch such attacks are assumed to belong to COI classes that are
not part of the sensitive COI classes. This is especially evident in the novice user scenario.
For the experienced user, a non-judicious choice of classes can pose a security risk.
The Auto-FBI design does not account for communication or sharing of execution state
among browser instances through channels other than the network or browser profile. In
particular, Local Shared Objects (LSO) can be used by Flash scripts embedded in web pages
in a similar manner as HTTP cookies to communicate with other Flash scripts running in
completely different browsers. In fact, an LSO can be used by websites to track users across
multiple browsers or after deleting HTTP cookies [65].
System call interposition methods inherently suffer from the Time Of Check Time Of
Use (TOCTOU) race conditions [33]. However, for the purpose of Auto-FBI, such race
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conditions are not a major concern since the browser code is assumed to be benign and
furthermore the threat model does not include threats that can compromise the browser
itself.
Since the enforcer prevents the browser instance from connecting to websites outside
of its COI class, attackers cannot directly launch a CSRF attack from an attacker-controlled
website targeting a sensitive website in another COI class. However, they can craft a CSRF
link and lure the user into clicking on the link so that the enabler would open the link in
another browser instance. It is easy to prevent such attacks by sanitizing the URLs before
opening. The enabler daemon can strip the query and path parts of the URL [9] before
opening it in another browser instance. This URL sanitization was not implemented in the
Auto-FBI prototype which is a limitation of the implementation.
3.7 Limitations
The prototype implementation of Auto-FBI has a few limitations:
1. It does not support IPv6.
2. The configuration syntax is not general. A more powerful syntax could allow wild-
card expressions for specifying domain names.
3. The enabler daemon does not sanitize URLs before opening.
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Chapter 4
COOPERATIVE CONTAINERS FOR DESKTOP SYSTEMS
This chapter identifies the shortcomings of Bromium and Qubes OS, the two main
compartmentalization solutions for the Desktop and propose a new system, FlexICon, that
presents an attractive alternative in the design space of compartmentalization solutions on
the desktop. Unlike Bromium, FlexICon does not require modifying applications and is
not limited to a handful of supported applications. Like Qubes, and unlike Bromium, FlexI-
Con requires separate windows for viewing browser tabs that need to be isolated from each
other. Unlike Qubes, FlexICon provides seamless transitions between browser instances in
various containers. FlexICon allows the creation of containers based on online sources of
content as well as containers that are not tied to online sources. At the heart of FlexICon
is a mechanism that allows the definition of flexible containers with the ability to specify
a rich set of access constraints to be enforced for each container. The prototype system is
implemented on Ubuntu and supports the Firefox browser.
4.1 Existing Approaches
Attackers leverage the fact that programs are executed with broad access privileges. A
common attack vector involves tricking users into downloading and executing seemingly
useful and benign programs which are in fact malicious. Another common attack vector
involves opening malicious documents that are specially crafted to exploit certain vulnera-
bilities in benign applications.
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4.1.1 Inefficacy of Traditional Methods
Desktop operating system vendors mainly rely on the following mechanisms to ad-
dress the aforementioned attack vectors: a) monitoring for suspicious behaviors through
anti-virus software, b) patching discovered software vulnerabilities, c) various runtime and
compiler mechanisms aimed at mitigating program vulnerabilities including Address Space
Layout Randomization, and Data Execution Prevention, d) sandboxing certain applications.
Monitoring for knownmalware or suspicious behavior is not a bullet-proof solution [15,
31]. Although it is necessary to patch software vulnerabilities, this strategy is not very ef-
fective in protecting end-users due to slow adoption of software patches by end-users [38,
41]. Exploit mitigation techniques make it harder for attackers to attack benign programs,
but not impossible, especially considering new attack methods such as return-oriented pro-
gramming [18, 24]. In case of sandboxing, it is only applied to certain applications e.g.
applications distributed through Mac App Store. Moreover, once malicious code or data
gets past these obstacles, it can damage and steal all user data without restriction.
4.1.2 System Compartmentalization
A practical solution to this problem must not require radical changes to operating sys-
tems or existing applications since such a solution would be met with huge resistance from
software vendors that have made considerable investments in their software products.
System compartmentalization can be used to mitigate the problem without changing
operating system APIs or applications. The idea is to partition the execution environment
into multiple containers each having limited access to user data and system resources. Two
existing systems that employ this technique are Bromium [12] and Qubes OS [60]. Both
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systems use full virtualization based onXen [49]. These two systems represent two different
design points in the design space of system compartmentalization solutions.
4.1.2.1 Qubes
Qubes exposes the management of containers to the user through graphical user inter-
faces and does not help the user in how they would compartmentalize their activities. How-
ever, unlike Bromium, Qubes provides compartmentalization for device drivers in addition
to user programs. Qubes uses full virtualization without optimization which normally has
high overhead, slow to boot containers, and cannot handle more than a dozen containers.
4.1.2.2 Bromium
Bromium does not expose container management to the user, it automatically isolates
user tasks that deal with untrusted data in MicroVMs. A user task can be opening an un-
trusted PDF document or navigating to a website in a single browser tab. Bromium uses
memory throttling and other optimizations to reduce the full virtualization overhead dra-
matically for a limited set of supported applications. The downside of this method is that
it only works for supported applications. Unsupported applications revert back to legacy
mode with high overhead and no access to user data when executed in a VM. In order to
open files with an unsupported application, the user needs to run that application without
compartmentalization. Another downside is that it requires changing some applications
such as the browser to achieve fine-grained compartmentalization, i.e. isolating tabs.
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4.2 An Alternative Approach
FlexICon is a new approach to system compartmentalization that addresses some of the
shortcoming of Bromium and Qubes. FlexICon is designed to achieve the following goals:
(a) no modification to applications, (b) high performance, (c) reducing the effects of user
mistakes, and (d) security. To achieve these goals FlexICon employs the following design
elements:
• Light-weight virtualization based on Linux namespaces to achieve low overhead.
• A declarative language for defining containers by specifying resource restrictions for
each container and rules for assigning processes to containers.
• A trusted file dialog for applications running in containers which allows the user to
pick any file and if necessary open the selected file in another container.
• A browser extension to provide seamless transition between browser instances run-
ning in different containers.
Using light-weight virtualization affords FlexICon low performance overhead and small
memory footprint without the need to modify or exclude applications. The container spec-
ification language allows FlexICon to enforce resource (files and network end-points) re-
strictions for applications running in containers and automatically decide which container
to use for each user command (opening a document or navigating a website). The enforce-
ment of restrictions and automation of container assignments relieve the user of making
these decisions at runtime and reduce the effect of user mistakes on security. The trusted
file dialog has two main benefits: (a) provide seamless access to all user files in the dialog,
(b) provide a mechanism for transferring data between containers when needed by direct
user designation. Finally, the browser extension enables the user to click on any link in any
browser instance and have the system open the link in the proper browser instance.
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4.2.1 Overview of FlexICon
FlexICon containers are restricted execution environments for user applications. There
are several configuration options for each container, including: (a) folders that are directly
accessible in the container, (b) network end-points (fully qualified domain names) that are
accessible in the container, (c) applications that can execute in the container. Note that a
given application can be restricted to be executed in a given container or be allowed to have
different instances execute in different containers. If multiple instance of the applications
execute in different containers, they do not communicate with each other. By default, every
container has a dedicated folder in the user’s home directory within which applications
running in that container have regular access to files and folders. It is also possible to grant
access to other folders in the user’s home directory if desired. Containers have read-only
access to system files and no access to the user’s home directory or other containers by
default. It is possible to disable network access for a container, or allow restricted access
by black-listing / white-listing domain names.
It is also possible to specify rules for assigning processes to containers. When the user
wants to launch an application, either directly e.g. by clicking on an application launcher
or indirectly e.g. by opening a document, FlexICon consults a list of rules to decide which
container to use. These rules can be specified based on the following inputs: (1) the appli-
cation executable path, (2) any files passed as arguments to be opened, and (3) any URLs
passed as arguments to be navigated. FlexICon parses each user command to find the above
information and then checks the rules to decide which container should be used to execute
the command.
These two main mechanisms (containers and rules) provide great flexibility for isolat-
ing application instances, especially when combined with other mechanisms in FlexICon.
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Before using the system, one has to specify containers and rules, and FlexICon provides a
language for this purpose. The container and rule definitions can be prepared by the user
or someone with technical knowledge when installing FlexICon. The remainder of this
section explores various types of containers that can be created in FlexICon and introduces
other mechanisms available in FlexICon.
4.2.1.1 Web-based Containers
FlexICon containers can be used to compartmentalize web access to gain benefits simi-
lar to those gained by Auto-FBI. To compartmentalize web access, one can partition the set
of all websites into disjoint classes and make sure that each class of websites is accessed by
a separate browser instance.
FlexICon can enforce this policy by: (a) defining one container per class of websites,
(b) restricting the network access of such containers so that only domain names of websites
allowed in the respective class are accessible in the container, (c) adding rules that would
launch the browser in the respective container when a URL belonging to a certain class
is passed as argument. For example, if the user is particularly concerned about protecting
their banking data, he/she could have two classes, Banking for online banking and General
for everything else.
However, without any extra mechanisms, the above model would require the user to
specify a URL when launching the browser which would be cumbersome. FlexICon pro-
vides a browser extension that can solve this issue. The browser extension reports all user-
requested URLs to FlexICon so that if the current browser instance cannot access the re-
quested URL, FlexICon would open the URL in the proper container. Additionally, a rule
is needed to execute the browser in the General container when launched directly. These
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mechanisms together allow the user to navigate to different classes of websites in separate
containers without much hassle.
Additional rules can be added so that when the user tries to open documents stored in a
web-based container, the documents are opened in that same container. For example, a PDF
file that was downloaded in the General container, will be opened in the General container.
These rules would ensure that any potential damage from such documents does not spread
to other containers.
Note that in order to prevent CSRF attacks from a malicious site in one container tar-
geting a site in another container, FlexICon removes the path and query parts of the URL
before opening it in the target container. Otherwise, the protection gained by separating
websites in multiple containers would be lost since the attacker can simply trick the user
into clicking on a CSRF link and the system would open the link in the target container.
4.2.1.2 The User Container
When the user launches an application directly, FlexICon has no information about data
that will be processed by that application. A container with no access to network, dubbed
theUser container, can be used to launch certain applications in this case. Applications that
are typically used to generate content such as text editors are good candidates for launching
in the User container when launched directly. This would cause all user-generated contents
to be stored in a single container.
Note that it would be a bad idea to have multiple launchers for every application so
that the user chooses the container in which the application is to be launched, because it
forces the user to make a security decision prematurely. For instance, when the user wants
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to open a text editor to type something, the user would need to decide which container is
most suited for the intended content before even starting.
To enable users to save data generated in the User container in other containers, FlexI-
Con provides a mechanism that allows applications running in a container to save a file in
another container through a trusted file dialog. To enable this mechanism for a container,
the container definition should explicitly list which containers can be chosen by the user to
save a file through the trusted file dialog, and if no target container is listed in the container
definition, then this mechanism will be disabled for that container.
4.2.1.3 The Junk Container
To run unknown applications without worrying about such applications stealing user
data or compromising the integrity of the user data, such applications can always be exe-
cuted in the Junk container. This container is defined with minimal access to file system and
no network access (to prevent malicious software like distributed denial of service botnets).
Known but untrusted applications could be assigned to separate containers if they store
data that is valuable to the user.
4.2.1.4 The Email Container
Since email client applications deal with data from different sources that might not
coexist in a single container, it is best to run email clients in a dedicated container. There
are mechanisms in FlexICon designed for email use cases that are discussed next.
A common avenue for attackers to gain control of personal devices is to send malicious
attachments through email. The email container can be configured to open attachments
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in disposable containers. A disposable container is a single-use container that is deleted
after being used and only runs a single application instance. By opening email attachments
in disposable containers, the possibility of compromising the email container as well as
other containers is eliminated. To be able to store trusted attachments in other containers,
the trusted file dialog (the same mechanism that is used by the User container discussed
earlier) can be used.
To enable the user to attach files stored in other containers to an email, the trusted file
dialog would make the files selected by the user available to the email client for a limited
amount of time. This mechanism is specially designed for the email use case and is not the
default behavior of the trusted file dialog. Similar to the save mechanism, a list of source
containers must be explicitly specified in the container definition.
4.2.2 Policy
FlexICon policies enforce restrictions on the flow of data in the system. In order to
describe these restrictions some terminology is needed. A data flow is explicit if the data
flow requires explicit user interaction e.g. by selecting a file in a file dialog, otherwise
it is considered an implicit data flow. In a personal computer running an state of the art
operating systemwithout containers, a program started by the user can access all data owned
by that user and can leak such data without user’s knowledge to any remote host over the
network. In FlexICon, there are some implicit data flows possible, e.g. a program running
in a container can access data stored in that container without user’s knowledge and leak it to
domains accessible in that container. It is also possible to have explicit data flows between
containers through the file dialog mechanism. Reasoning about possible data flows allowed
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by a policy can be done by building a flow graph. The nodes in the graph represent the
following types of entities:
• Data: a folder containing user data
• Processes: processes running in a container
• Origins: a set of web origins (domain names)
• File dialog: a trusted file dialog
• URL trimmer: removes the path and query part of a URL before opening it in the
proper container
Each container definition can be directly mapped to a set of nodes and edges. For exam-
ple, a banking container would have its own data node representing the folder dedicated to
the banking container, a process node representing all processes running in the banking con-
tainer, an origins node representing all banking websites. If the container is configured to
be able to read or write data from/to other containers, file dialog node(s) should be created
as well. Figure 5 shows how to connect these nodes for one container.
If a rule’s target is not a disposable container, then no new data flow is created by the
rule. A rule with a disposable container target would induce a flow edge from the data node
to the processes node of the disposable container.
Finally, the processes nodes for all network-enabled containers must be connected to
a URL trimmer node and the URL trimmer node must be connected to all origins nodes.
These connections represent the URL handling mechanism in FlexICon: a browser exten-
sion in each container reports all user-requested URLs to the controller module and the
controller module would ensure that the URL is opened in the proper container after remov-
ing the path and query parts of the URL. A data flow path that passes through the URL
filter node would be a low bandwidth channel, because the protocol and hostname, which
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Figure 5. Flow graph nodes and edges for a single container
are preserved by the trimmer, are restricted to HTTP or HTTPS for the protocol and 255
characters for the hostname. If the container is malicious, it can communicate with a host
indirectly by making requests for URLs at that host, that would be serviced by a browser
instance at another container. Such leakage can be severely restricted by adding checks on
the rate of such requests, but the prototype implementation does not enforce rate limiting.
After building such a graph, one can answer data flow queries such as “can data stored
at location X implicitly flow to origin Y?”. An implicit flow would be represented by a
directed path that does not go though any file dialog nodes and an explicit flow is analogous
to a directed path that passes through at least 1 file dialog node.
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4.3 Threat Model
4.3.1 Scope
The target is a personal user system in which the user is not particularly motivated or
inclined to invest effort in security. The user can browse content from a variety of websites.
Some of these websites are potentially malicious and some can be reasonably expected to
be non-malicious. Malicious websites include both legitimate sites that have been compro-
mised by attackers to disseminate malware (this is the largest source of malware dissem-
ination [58]) as well as those that are launched by attackers who lure users into visiting
their websites. Non-malicious websites include sites that could be reasonably expected to
be secure, such as sites of banking institutions, or sites for large organizations that can be
expected to quickly patch any compromise.
This threat model includes an attacker who can surreptitiously download content and
execute it on the user system (drive-by download) if the user visits a site under the attacker’s
control. This attack subsumes other attacks such as CSRF, XSS, and Clickjacking, so it will
be the only attack assumed in this chapter. A drive-by download attack is assumed to be
able to take over the container in which the browser is executing.
It is assumed that the operating system mechanisms (including Linux namespaces [10]
and TUN/TAP [46]) are secure. The implementation of FlexICon is also assumed to be
secure. The point is to argue relative security.
Some applications are trusted if not executing malicious content and some other appli-
cations are not trusted.
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4.3.2 Security Goals
The main security goal is to protect the integrity of the user data from attackers (ran-
somware for example [34]) as well as providing some confidentiality. The integrity protec-
tion is paramount because compromising content in sensitive containers can compromise
the whole container. While confidentiality is important, if one wants to allow the user seam-
less access to data, allowing content from sensitive containers to be read by other containers
is unavoidable. This is needed to support an email application that can aggregate content
from multiple containers and cannot be allowed to execute in a sensitive container. So,
while absolute confidentiality is not a goal, all breaches of confidentiality must be initiated
by the user or be done over a low-bandwidth channel. This limits the rate at which a com-
promised container can siphon information from other containers. If other measures are in
place to clean-boot non-trusted containers, this will be effective in providing confidential-
ity.
4.4 Design & Implementation
This section presents the design and implementation of FlexICon.
4.4.1 System Design
FlexICon is composed of multiple modules. Figure 6 shows an overview of these mod-
ules and their relationships. The following is a high level description of these modules.
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Figure 6. FlexICon’s system architecture
4.4.1.1 Controller Module
The controller module is responsible for managing containers at runtime. It reads the
policy file to get container definitions and rules. It prepares configuration files for the
container and network modules based on container definitions in the policy. The controller
is also responsible for parsing user commands and assigning them to containers based on
the rules.
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4.4.1.2 Container Module
The container module is responsible for creating a single container. It does so based
on the configurations provided by the controller module which is in turn based on the con-
tainer definition in the policy. The container module employs a series of Bash scripts to
setup various aspects of the container, including mounting the system files and the con-
tainer’s home directory, setting up network devices and launching the network module, the
X window server and the GUI module. After setting up the container environment, the con-
tainer module waits for commands from the controller module to execute user commands
in the container environment.
4.4.1.3 Network Module
The network module is responsible for filtering network traffic of the container. It has
an internal white-list of IP addresses and it checks all outgoing IP packets and only allows
packets with a white-listed destination IP address. It also monitors DNSmessages to update
its IP white-list when the domain name in the DNS message is allowed by the policy.
4.4.1.4 Trusted File Dialog
The trusted file dialog runs outside all containers and can present all files to the user
for selection. Based on its configuration settings, it can provide the following mechanisms:
(a) opening selected files in their proper container, (b) saving data from one container to
another, and (c) reading data stored in a different container. Mechanism (a) is the default
behavior while the other mechanisms must be explicitly enabled for each container. It is
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also possible to limit the possible destinations and sources of data for mechanisms (b) and
(c). For instance, it is possible to allow the email container to read data from a subset of
containers to avoid leaking sensitive data by mistake.
4.4.1.5 URL Handling Module
The browser extension reports all user requested URLs, i.e. URLs typed in the address
bar, or a link / bookmark that was clicked by the user, to the URL handling module. The
URL handling module consults with the controller to figure out if the browser instance re-
porting the URL is allowed to access the reported URL and if not, it would ask the controller
to open the URL in the proper container after removing the path and query parts of the URL.
4.4.1.6 GUI Module
TheGUImodule is adapted fromQubes OS [60]. Every container gets a local Xwindow
server and the GUI module creates a bridge between the container’s X server and the X
server running outside all containers which has access to the graphics hardware. The GUI
module ensures that applications running in separate containers cannot spy on each other or
inject fake keyboard ormouse events. It also provides secure copy/paste between containers
through special keyboard combinations (Ctrl-Shift-C and Ctrl-Shift-V).
4.4.2 System Implementation
The FlexICon prototype is implemented for Ubuntu 14.04 with KDE desktop. This
section provides an overview of the implementation and highlights novel technical aspects
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of it. The implementation consists of 14360 lines of C/C++ code plus 1430 lines of Bash
scripts. Modules adapted from Qubes [60] are not included in these statistics.
To create containers Linux namespaces [10] are used similar to the Linux Containers
(LXC) project [48]. A notable difference in FlexICon’s implementation is the use of read-
only bind mounts to mount system files in each container which allows it to use a single
software stack.
When the user launches an application from the launchermenu or clicks on a file to open,
the result is a command that includes the application’s executable path and zero or more
arguments that may or may not be interpreted as files or URLs by the target application.
The controller module is responsible for parsing these commands. An interesting challenge
is to correctly identify arguments that would be interpreted as files or URLs by the target
application so that policy rules can be applied to the user command to figure out which
container should be used. FlexICon interprets a given command based on its knowledge of
how the target application would parse its options (information that can be typically found
in man pages).
The standard file dialog in KDE is amended to show a trusted file dialog running outside
of the container and let the user pick any file. The system then decides how to handle
the user’s selection in accordance with its policy. Normally, if the user chooses to open a
file that is already available in the container from which the dialog was launched, it just
reports the selected file back to the caller. However, if a file is picked that is not available
in the caller’s container, the system opens the selected file in the proper container. Other
mechanisms of the trusted file dialog, namely the “save file in another container” and “read
file from another container”, are implemented by creating hard links.
To enable graphics display access in containers, the GUI module from Qubes OS [60]
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Figure 7. Adapted Qubes GUI module
Figure 8. Example window border colors
was adopted. Each container gets its own instance of the X window server with a dummy
video driver that is backed by a buffer in main memory instead of access to real graph-
ics hardware. The Qubes GUI Agent running inside the container alongside the X server
(Xorg in the diagram) acts as a desktop manager for the container and communicates with
the Qubes GUI Daemon running outside the container alongside the main X server that has
access to graphics hardware. The image of a window of a program running inside the con-
tainer is rendered on the actual graphics display through shared memory pages. The Agent
and Daemon modules also communicate keyboard and mouse events for applications run-
ning in the container. Figure 7 shows details of these modules. To adapt these modules from
Qubes OS which uses Xen virtualization, parts of the code responsible for communication
between the agent and the daemon were modified to use Unix domain sockets.
The windows belonging to applications running in containers are shown with colored
borders and the name of the container is shown in the title-bar. The border color is con-
figurable for each container and can be chosen from 8 predefined colors. A different color
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is reserved for windows of processes running outside any container. The border color can
be used for the following purposes: a) to convey the level of trust for applications, docu-
ments and websites opened in that container, or b) to easily distinguish windows belonging
to different containers. Example colored window borders and title-bars are shown in Fig-
ure 8. Even windows that do not have a title-bar, for example right-click context menus,
are rendered with a thin border of the same color.
To enable networking in containers a pair of TUN [46] virtual network devices are
created and a user-space program sits between the TUN devices to control network traffic
(see Figure 6). The network filtering module can be configured to allow or disallow traffic
based on fully qualified domain names as well as IP addresses. Internally, it has a white-
list of IP addresses and it inspects DNS responses received through the tunnel to associate
DNS names with IP addresses. The details of container networking is illustrated in the next
section with an example.
4.4.2.1 Container Networking
In the following discussion it is assumed that there is a Banking container that is allowed
to access www.bank.com but not www.example.com. The interactions of a browser running
in the Banking container with the network module is illustrated in Figures 9, 10 and 11.
The network module instance serving the Banking container is set up in the follow-
ing way: TUN1 has IP address 169.254.1.1, TUN0 has IP address 169.254.1.2,
dnsmasq is listening for DNS requests on TUN0 and finally the nameserver is set to
169.254.1.2 in the container’s /etc/resolv.conf file. The network module
adds the IP address of TUN0 to its internal white-list upon starting to allow DNS requests
to go through.
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Figure 9. Resolving a DNS name
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Accessing www.bank.com The numbers in parentheses refer to steps depicted in Fig-
ure 9:
(1) The user instructs the browser to navigate to www.bank.com.
(2) The browser sends a DNS request to find the IP address for www.bank.com, the
DNS request has the following destination IP address: 169.254.1.2 due to the
nameserver setting.
(3) The network module receives the DNS request packet, it checks the destination IP
address and allows the packet to pass through since the IP address 169.254.1.2
is listed in its internal white-list.
(4) The DNS request packet is sent out to TUN0.
(5) The DNS client (dnsmasq) listening for DNS requests on TUN0 receives the packet.
(6,7,8,9) The DNS client resolves www.bank.com by accessing the Internet through the real
network device eth0.
(10) The DNS client generates a DNS response mapping www.bank.com to IP address
23.210.156.32 and sends it back to the browser through TUN0.
(11) The network module receives the DNS response.
(12) The network module examines the DNS response and consults its configuration file
to see if www.bank.com is allowed. Since www.bank.com is allowed, it adds the
corresponding IP address 23.210.156.32 to its internal white-list.
(13) The network module lets the DNS response to go through.
(14) The browser receives the DNS response and figures out the IP address for www.bank.
com.
At this point the browser can initiate an HTTP connection to the bank website by using
the IP address acquired in the previous steps. The numbers in parentheses in the rest of this
discussion refer to steps depicted in Figure 10.
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(15) The browser starts accessing www.bank.com by sending an IP packet to
23.210.156.32.
(16) The network module receives the packet.
(17) The network module checks the destination IP address, 23.210.156.32, against
its internal white-list and since it is listed there, it allows the packet to go through.
(18) The kernel routes the IP packet using NAT to the real network device eth0.
(19) The packet is sent over the Internet.
(20) The web server for www.bank.com sends a response which is received by the real
network device.
(21) The kernel routes the packet to TUN0 following NAT rules.
(22) The response packet is received by the network module.
(23) The network module allows the packet to go through.
(24) The browser receives the web server response.
Accessing www.example.com The first steps for accessing www.example.com is the
same as those described earlier (depicted in Figure 9) with one exception: step (12) will
be executed differently. Since www.example.com is not allowed according to the network
module’s configuration, the IP address will not be added to the white-list. The browser
acquires the IP address for www.example.com i.e. 93.184.216.34, but that IP address
is not added to the internal white-list of the networkingmodule. The numbers in parentheses
refer to steps depicted in Figure 11:
(1) The browser starts accessing www.example.com by sending an IP packet to
93.184.216.34.
(2) The network module receives the packet.
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Figure 10. Successful IP connection
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Figure 11. Connecting to an unlisted IP address
(3) The network module checks the destination IP address 93.184.216.34 against
its internal white-list and since it is not listed there, it drops the packet. It then gener-
ates an ICMP Destination Unreachable response for the browser.
(4) The browser receives the Destination Unreachable response.
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# Container definition
container ”Sensitive” {
color_index: 4
gui: true
system_files: normal
home_extras: []
save_as_other_containers: []
read_from_other_containers: []
network_access: true
domains {
+ ”[*.]bank1.com”,
+ ”[*.]bank2.com”,
- ”*”
}
usr_bin { + ”*” }
}
Figure 12. Sample FlexICon container definition
4.4.2.2 Configuration Syntax
The configuration file in FlexICon is composed of two main parts: (1) container speci-
fications, and (2) rules. The first part, defines all containers in the system. It specifies what
resources are available in each container. Figure 12 shows an example container specifica-
tion. Note that container definitions start with the keyword containerwhile disposable
containers are defined with thedisposable keyword instead. The configuration options
for each container are as follows:
• Name: a string that uniquely identifies the container and is used to refer to that con-
tainer in rules.
• Color index: window border color specified as a number between 1 to 8.
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• GUI: does the container need GUI capability.
• System files: can be used to further restrict access to system files.
• Home extras: other folders in the user’s home directory that must be accessible in
the container.
• Save as other containers: list of container names that can be selected by the user in
the trusted file dialog to save data originating from this container.
• Read from other containers: list of container names that can be selected by the user
in the trusted file dialog to read data from.
• Network access: whether or not the container should be allowed to access network.
• Domains: a black/white list of domain names that are allowed in the container.
• User binaries: black/white list of programs in /usr/bin available in the container.
The second part of the configuration file (list of rules) is used to determine which con-
tainer should be used to run a given command. Figure 13 shows two example rules related
to the previous example container. Given a user command, if all conditions in the body of
a rule are satisfied, the command is executed in the target container. Rules that are listed
first in the policy have higher priority. Each rule has the following parts:
• A black/white list of applications that are accepted by the rule.
• An optional black/white list of files that are matched against the files passed as argu-
ments to the application.
• An optional black/white list of URLs that are matched against the URLs passed as
arguments to the application.
• A target container that will be used to launch the application if the rule matches the
given command.
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# Rule 1: open sensitive files in Sensitive
if {
application {
+ ”/usr/bin/firefox”,
+ ”/usr/bin/okular”,
+ ”/usr/bin/kate”,
- ”*”
}
file {
+ ”/Sensitive/*”,
- ”*”
}
} then ”Sensitive”
# Rule 2: open bank URLs in Sensitive
if {
application {
+ ”/usr/bin/firefox”,
- ”*”
}
url {
+ ”^://[^.]bank1.com[/*]”,
+ ”^://[^.]bank2.com[/*]”,
- ”*”
}
} then ”Sensitive”
Figure 13. Sample FlexICon rule definitions
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# Define bank URLs as a list of strings
define BANK_URLS [
”^://[^.]bank1.com[/*]”,
”^://[^.]bank2.com[/*]”
]
# Define a white-list for browsers
define BROWSER { + ”/usr/bin/firefox”, - ”*” }
# Rules using previous definitions
if {
application BROWSER
url { + BANK_URLS, - ”*” }
} then ”Sensitive”
if {
application BROWSER
url { - BANK_URLS, + ”*” }
} then ”General”
Figure 14. Avoiding repetition with definitions
Wildcard expressions can be used in specifying black/white lists. The following are
special characters that can be used in wildcard expressions:
• ’*’: matches a sequence of zero or more characters
• ’^’: matches a sequence of zero or more characters excluding slash (/)
• ’[]’: can be used to specify an optional segment
• ’\’: can be used to designate the literal value of any of the special characters
The configuration syntax also allows for defining strings, lists of strings and black/white
lists using the define keyword to avoid repetition. Figure 14 shows an example of using
such definitions to avoid repetition. A full example configuration is listed in Appendix A.
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4.5 Security Evaluation
In security, improvement depends on the particular policy specified. However, the fol-
lowing can be stated about FlexICon in general:
• Restricted Access: Malicious code or data running in a container can only compro-
mise user data that is available in that container and that can be specified to be as
little or as much as the user needs.
• Browser Security: It is possible to access different websites in separate containers, to
eliminate the possibility of cross-origin attacks. This is also useful for protecting the
browser state (cookies, saved passwords, history). Each container will store browser
state related to websites assigned to that container only.
• The Human Error Factor: An important aspect of FlexICon is the ability to spec-
ify a security policy in a rule-based language and mechanisms that allow seamless
navigation in the user interface. The automatic enforcement of the policy means that
the user is less involved in making security decisions, which, according to HCI re-
search [22, 40], would reduce human error and improve security. In comparison,
Qubes does not reduce the burden of decision making on the user which could have
an adverse effect on security.
4.5.1 Attack Surface & the TCB
In order for a container to successfully “contain” a process, the process must not be
able to bypass the isolation mechanism. The attack surface that the system presents can
give an indication of the security of FlexICon relative to Bromium and Qubes if one does
not consider the benefits of automatic enforcement of policy. A quantitative analysis of the
65
attack surface like the one described in [52] is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but a
qualitative analysis is provided next.
FlexICon’s containers use Linux namespaces as well as other Linux system calls to
provide isolation. A single Linux kernel is shared by all processes running in all contain-
ers which affords FlexICon a very low performance overhead, however, since Linux is a
monolithic OS, this also means that a vulnerability in the kernel could be used by a mali-
cious process to change the internal state of the kernel in order to bypass the isolation. In
comparison, Qubes and Bromium provide isolation using full virtualization (both based on
the Xen hypervisor). The attack surface of the isolation mechanism in a Xen-based system
includes the Xen hypervisor and the software running in the control domain (or dom0 us-
ing Xen terminology). The control domain is responsible for emulating hardware for other
domains and launching new VMs. Both Bromium and Qubes run a full software stack in
the control domain although Qubes further disaggregates this domain by running network
and USB drivers in separate domains. Comparing the attack surface of FlexICon to that of
Qubes or Bromium is not easy; although the size of TCB seems comparable, the complexity
and number of interfaces exposed are not the same. At a high level, interfaces exposed by
Xen and its control domain are simpler and fewer than those exposed by the Linux kernel.
Therefore, one can argue that Bromium and Qubes provide stronger security guarantees
compared to FlexICon from an attack surface perspective.
Other FlexICon components that might be targeted by malicious processes in order
to bypass the isolation should also be included in this analysis. Components in Figure 6
that are outside the boundary of the container run directly on the host in order to provide
services for the container. Some of these components accept inputs from inside the container
that could be manipulated by a malicious process. These components are: Qubes GUI
daemon, network module, URL handling module and the standard file dialog provider. A
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vulnerability in these components could enable a malicious process to escape the isolation.
The total size of these components is about 8.8 KLOC.
All 3 systems are susceptible to side channel attacks, but since the kernel is shared
among containers in FlexICon, unlike Qubes and Bromium where each VM runs on a sep-
arate kernel, FlexICon could be more susceptible to side channel attacks.
4.5.2 Network Attacks
This section discusses different ways that FlexICon’s network module could be sub-
verted in a way that Internet domains that are not allowed in a container according to the
policy become accessible in that container.
4.5.2.1 Subverting the Network Filtering through DNS
FlexICon’s network filtering module uses DNS responses received from the Internet
to associate IP addresses with fully qualified domain names. It is assumed that DNS re-
sponses are trustworthy. An active network attacker controlling the user’s access point
to the Internet can subvert the network filtering mechanism by changing DNS responses.
This vulnerability stems from the design of DNS which does not provide any authentication
mechanism in its basic form [4]. A solution to this problem would be to adopt DNSSEC to
detect forged DNS messages. This problem is not specific to FlexICon and it is orthogonal
to the problem addressed in this chapter.
An attacker that controls a name server can respond dishonestly to DNS requests for
domain names under its control in order to circumvent the network filtering mechanism.
Since credentials such as session ids and other cookies belonging to the target website are
67
not transmitted in this scenario, there is little concern about the outcome of such an attack in
general. However, if it is possible for the attacker to associate a domain name with a private
IP address, the attacker could gain unauthorized access to unprotected local web consoles
such as the WiFi router settings [37]. This can be easily addressed in the network filtering
module by preventing private IP addresses from being added to the internal white-list when
processing DNS responses.
4.5.2.2 Subverting the Network Filtering through Proxy
Another possibility for accessing websites that are not allowed in a container is to route
the requests through a proxy server. If a container is compromised by malicious code, it
would be possible for the attacker to change the browser’s network settings in that container
and set a proxy. In this scenario the browser running in the compromised container might be
able to access any website. Note that this attack does not provide access to other containers.
Also, a savvy user who notices that the container name shown in the title bar does not
match the container that a website is supposed to be rendered in would not enter sensitive
credentials on the website. It should also be noted here that malicious code running in
a container cannot change the border color and name of the container shown in the title
bar since those are controlled by code running outside the container and also full screen
windows are not allowed. Nevertheless, usable security research [2] shows that users tend
to ignore such passive visual cues and this should not be relied upon as a way to counter
this threat. To eliminate the possibility of this attack, other mechanisms for preventing code
running in a container from changing browser proxy settings are needed.
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4.6 Limitations
The network module in FlexICon relies on DNS to filter container’s network traffic. In
general it is possible that different domain names are mapped to the same IP addresses, e.g.
Google Search and Gmail. Therefore, it is not always possible to isolate two websites in
separate containers since allowing one could mean allowing both.
If a container is compromised, the mechanism that allows the browser extension to
report URLs to the controller could be abused by malicious code to open large number of
browser tabs which can be a nuisance. One could limit the rate of this reporting and tie it
to user input activity and use it to detect rogue containers. However, such a solution was
not implemented in FlexICon.
FlexICon does not currently support sound in containers. This can be solved for exam-
ple by running PulseAudio in each container and passing the sound data back to the host
through a Unix domain socket similar to what Qubes has done for sound support.
The controller module in FlexICon parses user commands to identify files and URLs
passed as arguments. The current implementation supports a limited number of applica-
tions.
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Chapter 5
COMPARING SYSTEM COMPARTMENTALIZATION SOLUTIONS
This chapter provides a detailed performance evaluation of Qubes, Bromium and Flex-
ICon. The performance evaluations are designed to answer the following questions about
these three compartmentalization solutions: (a) how many containers can be created with-
out using swap memory, (b) how long does it take to prepare a container and launch an
application in it, (c) disk access overhead, and (d) network access overhead. A qualitative
analysis of GUI performance for FlexICon and Qubes is also presented at the end.
5.1 Test Setup
The following software setups were used for performance evaluations:
• Qubes: Qubes OS R3.2
• Bromium: beta version of Bromium for home users (vSentry 4.0.2.1276) running
on Windows 10 Enterprise with policy controlled by Bromium
• FlexICon: installed on Ubuntu 14.04.5 with KDE desktop
All tests were performed on the same machine with identical hard drives. The test
machine (Dell OptiPlex 990) was equipped with 8 GB of memory and an Intel Core i5-
2400 CPU with 4 cores. The hard drives were Western Digital WD5000AAKX (16 MB
cache, 7200 RPM). The term native Linux refers to Ubuntu 14.04.5 and the term native
Windows refers to Windows 10 Enterprise edition. The term container is used to refer to
FlexICon containers as well as Qubes AppVMs and Bromium MicroVMs. The error bars
in diagrams show standard deviation.
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5.2 Maximum Number of Containers
To find out how many containers can execute simultaneously, new instances of various
applications were launched in separate containers until the system ran out of memory. The
following applications were tested: the terminal emulator (xterm), the PDF viewer (evince
for Qubes, okular for FlexICon and Adobe Reader for Bromium) displaying a 13 page
academic paper, the Firefox browser displaying its default start page (for FlexICon and
Qubes) and Internet Explorer displaying an empty page (for Bromium), and a simple hello
world program written in Go. Of course, in real use there will be a mixture of different
applications running simultaneously and the memory usage of applications can increase
with user interaction, but this experiment can provide a rough idea of how the system scales.
In Qubes, the system refuses to spawn a new container if there is not enough main mem-
ory left. For FlexICon, the amount of swap space used by the system was monitored and
the test was stopped once swap usage was greater than zero. For Bromium, the Windows
page file was set to the minimum possible value of 16 MB and test was stopped once the
system produced error messages regarding memory. The maximum number of containers
that could be spawned on the test machine are listed in Table 3. It should be noted that there
are 3 default VMs in Qubes that are needed for the system to function properly: dom0,
sys-net and sys-firewall. The numbers in the table do not include these 3 VMs.
The results show that with 8 GB of memory, Qubes cannot exceed 16 AppVMs, while
FlexICon can achieve much higher number of instances. For Bromium, when Internet Ex-
plorer is set to open websites in new tabs, a large number of instances can be created which
is the result of the careful engineering that Bromium has done to control the memory usage
of the browser. However, interestingly, only 16 instances of the hello world program could
be created in Bromium. This is perhaps due to the fact that when encountering unknown
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Table 3. Maximum number of containers
Application FlexICon Qubes Bromium
Terminal 164 16 -
Hello world 185 16 16
PDF viewer 83 15 153
Firefox 34 11 -
IE (tab) - - 491
IE (window) - - 64
applications, Bromium reverts back to what they call legacy VMs which are essentially nor-
mal Xen domains. In case of known and supported applications such as Internet Explorer
and Adobe PDF viewer, Bromium manages to create many more instances by using mem-
ory throttling and other techniques. This strategy requires making changes to applications
and would only work for supported applications.
5.2.1 FlexICon’s Memory Usage
To measure the memory overhead of FlexICon containers, the following two tests were
performed while monitoring the system memory usage as reported by free. In the first
test, 30 containers running the terminal emulator were spawned. In the second test, 30 con-
tainers running the Firefox browser were spawned. The memory usage of the container
includes the memory needed by various FlexICon modules as well as the memory used
by Xorg and various KDE processes (e.g. kdeinit4) running inside the container, but
excludes the memory used by the application launched inside the container (e.g. Firefox).
The memory usage of the container can vary slightly depending on the application(s) run-
ning in the container. This is due to auxiliary system processes that are needed by each
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specific application. On the test machine, the memory usage of each container ranged from
32.8 MB to 36.5 MB.
5.3 Container Load Delay
The load delay of containers wasmeasured for FlexICon andQubes. Note that Bromium
does not provide a means to control the loading of MicroVMs. To measure the load delay,
the terminal emulator was configured to run a script upon its start that would record in a text
file the time it was executed. To calculate the container load delay, the timestamp recorded
by the script was subtracted from the timestamp of issuing the command to start the terminal.
These measurements were validated using multiple manual wall clock measurements. The
container load delay was measured in two scenarios: when loading containers one at a time
and when loading concurrently.
5.3.1 Loading Containers One at a Time
To measure container load delay, 14 Qubes AppVMs and 32 FlexICon containers were
spawned one at a time. The following external CPU loads were applied: from 0 to 100%
load in increments of 25%. In each case the tests were repeated 10 times. The external CPU
load was generated using a simple infinite busy loop engaging 0 to 4 CPU cores. Figure 15
shows the average load delay of containers under these scenarios. On average it takes 0.8 to
1.8 seconds to boot a FlexICon container and 9.5 to 15.6 seconds to boot a Qubes AppVM.
FlexICon containers load more than 10 times faster than Qubes AppVMs on average.
The reported container load delays include the time it takes to launch the terminal.
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Figure 15. Loading containers one at a time
Figure 16. Start delay of xterm in a pre-loaded container
74
Therefore, the time it takes to launch the terminal in a pre-loaded container was also mea-
sured. The results are shown in Figure 16. On average it takes 0.05 to 0.08 seconds to
launch xterm in a FlexICon container and 0.23 to 0.29 seconds in a Qubes AppVM. Note
that although the same program was used in both platforms, the start delays are very differ-
ent. This is probably due to better cache utilization in FlexICon6.
5.3.2 Loading Containers Concurrently
Up to 32 FlexICon containers and 12 Qubes AppVMs were spawned concurrently. Fig-
ure 17 shows the average load delay of containers for this experiment. For comparison,
it takes 9.4 seconds to launch 32 FlexICon containers, and 10.3 seconds to launch just 2
Qubes AppVMs. Launching 12 containers concurrently takes 3.6 seconds for FlexICon,
and 40.5 seconds for Qubes.
5.3.3 Browser Launch Delay
The time it takes to launch the browser was measured on native Linux, a pre-loaded
FlexICon container, a pre-loaded Qubes AppVM and a Bromium MicroVM. Firefox was
used on native Linux, FlexICon and Qubes. Internet Explorer was used on Bromium. Two
scenarios were tested in each case: cold and warm cache (referring to OS disk cache). The
cold cache numbers are relevant to a freshly booted system when the cache is not warmed
yet, i.e. the first time the user launches the browser after booting the machine. After the
first launch, the cache is warmed and subsequent launches will be much faster. To simulate
6Linux caches recently accessed files in memory. When starting a container in FlexICon, the system
accesses much smaller files compared to Qubes AppVMs, which leads to better cache utilization.
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Figure 17. Loading containers concurrently
cold cache on Windows (for Bromium), the Superfetch service was turned off and a simple
program was used to allocate huge amount of RAM which forces Windows to drop cached
files. On Linux platforms (for native Linux, FlexICon and Qubes), the following command
was used to drop caches:
$ echo 3 > /proc/sys/vm/drop_caches
The results are summarized in Figure 18. The browser launch delay is slightly better for
FlexICon compared to native Linux, which is interesting. Overall, considering variations
in browser types and versions among the studied platforms, the numbers are similar.
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Figure 18. Browser start delay
5.4 Disk Access Overhead
The disk read/write overhead for FlexICon, Qubes and Bromium was measured using
two programs written in Go (which can be compiled and executed without change on all
platforms). The programs performed the same operations (semantically) on all platforms,
specifically in regards to the Sync() operation7 which ensures the data is written to disk
before returning. The Go garbage collector was disabled and static buffers were used for
read and write. To calculate the overhead, the following comparisons were performed:
• For FlexICon: native Linux vs. a FlexICon container
• For Qubes: dom0 vs. an AppVM
• For Bromium: native Windows vs. a MicroVM
7See os.File type at https://golang.org/pkg/os/.
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Figure 19. Disk read overhead
5.4.1 Disk Read Throughput
Disk read throughput was measured for 1 GB files. To avoid reading from the cache,
10 different files were read in succession. Since the total size (10 GB) is larger than the
available RAM, the files will not fit in the cache. The following buffer sizes were tested:
16 MB, 32 MB and 64 MB. Each scenario was repeated 10 times. Figure 19 shows the
relative overheads. FlexICon and Qubes have no overhead while Bromium has an 82%
overhead. This large overhead is probably caused by a mechanism in Bromium that looks
for suspicious activity in MicroVMs for reporting purposes.
Note that the baseline values for all platforms were very close, so it is meaningful to
make a comparison based on the relative overheads shown in Figure 19. A box plot of the
read throughput data is shown in Figure 20.
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Figure 20. Box plot of disk read throughput data
5.4.2 Disk Write Speed
The time it takes to write files of various sizes was measured for all platforms. The
following file sizes were tested: 1 KB, 16 KB, 128 KB, 1 MB, 16 MB, 128 MB and 1 GB.
The entire contents of the file was generated in one buffer and written to the disk with one
call to the Write() method. To ensure the file is fully written on the disk, a call to the
Sync() method was made before closing the file. Figure 21 summarizes the calculated
overheads for all file sizes. The results show no overhead for FlexICon as expected. Qubes
shows higher overhead for smaller files, and Bromium shows higher overhead for larger
files. Figures 22, 23, 24 and 25 show box plots of disk write speed data.
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Figure 21. Disk write overhead
Figure 22. Box plot of disk write speed data for tiny files
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Figure 23. Box plot of disk write speed data for small files
Figure 24. Box plot of disk write speed data for medium files
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Figure 25. Box plot of disk write speed data for large files
5.4.3 Copying Files Between Containers
The time it takes to copy files of various sizes from one container to another was mea-
sured for both Qubes and FlexICon. Note that it is not possible to copy files between
MicroVMs in Bromium. Qubes provides a command for copying files between containers
(qvm-copy-to-vm). For FlexICon, cp followed by sync was used to copy files be-
tween containers. In both cases the measured time reflects the time it takes to fully commit
the data to disk. Figure 26 shows the average time for copying files between containers.
Qubes takes longer to copy files compared to FlexICon and the difference is more pro-
nounced for smaller files.
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Figure 26. Copying files between containers
5.5 Network Access Overhead
To measure network throughput and latency, a 100 Mbps LAN with two computers
was used to avoid network unpredictability problems. To calculate overhead, the following
baselines were used:
• For FlexICon: native Linux was used as baseline
• For Qubes: sys-net VM was used as baseline since it has direct access to network
hardware
• For Bromium: native Windows was used as baseline
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5.5.1 Network Latency
To measure network latency, lighttpdwas used to serve files of various sizes on the
server and a program written in Go was used on the test machine to download the files. To
account for the effect of concurrent network access, either 1, 2, 4 or 8 files were downloaded
concurrently. The absolute overhead values are shown in Figures 27, 28, 29 and 30.
The results indicate that FlexICon has the lowest overhead among the three, while
Bromium has the highest overhead which is probably affected by the monitoring system
in Bromium that looks for suspicious activity in MicroVMs. It appears that the overhead
does not scale proportionately with the file size, which means the relative overhead goes
down with larger file sizes. For example, for FlexICon, the largest relative overhead is for
1 KB files downloaded serially (roughly 15%), and the smallest relative overhead is for
10 MB files (≤ 0.01%).
5.5.2 Network Throughput
To measure network throughput, iperf version 3 was used. The goal was to find the
maximum possible throughput for the test network setup on all platforms. iperf was set to
execute for 5 minutes in each direction (upload and download) for all platforms. The results
show that the throughput is not affected for any of the three systems. Table 4 summarizes
the results.
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Figure 27. Latency overhead for serial downloads
Figure 28. Latency overhead for 2 concurrent downloads
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Figure 29. Latency overhead for 4 concurrent downloads
Figure 30. Latency overhead for 8 concurrent downloads
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Table 4. Network throughput
Platform Download Upload
Native Linux 94.2 Mbps 94.0 Mbps
FlexICon 94.2 Mbps 94.0 Mbps
Native Windows 94.9 Mbps 94.7 Mbps
Bromium 94.9 Mbps 94.7 Mbps
Qubes sys-net 94.9 Mbps 94.7 Mbps
Qubes AppVM 94.9 Mbps 94.7 Mbps
5.6 GUI
Measuring the performance overhead of the GUI system is complicated due to the way
the X server in the container and the X server running on the host interact with each other.
There is not much feedback from the host to the container about what has been successfully
drawn on the screen which means, for example, that frame rate statistics reported by a
video player inside the container is not accurate. However, a qualitative analysis of the GUI
performance and its limitations is possible. It should also be noted that the GUI performance
of FlexICon would be similar to that of Qubes since the same model is used in both cases.
Qualitative analysis of the graphic user interface did not reveal any noticeable perfor-
mance overhead when browsing the web, playing multiple videos or viewing documents.
The reason is that the GUI module uses shared memory for rendering container windows,
so rendering is at RAM speed and no copying is involved. On the other hand, 3D rendering
in containers is performed by the CPU because the X server running in the container does
not have access to the GPU. This means that 3D rendering in containers is not going to be
fast.
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Chapter 6
CONCLUSION & FUTURE WORK
This dissertation has shown that it is possible to automate the best practice of com-
partmentalizing access to web content in a mostly browser-independent manner without
changing the browser codebase that can be ported to all major desktop operating systems.
However, a limitation of this method is the imperfect isolation of browser instances which
can be solved by moving to a more comprehensive compartmentalization solution.
This dissertation has shown that it is possible to have a compartmentalization solution
that achieves high performance while providing significant improvement to the security of
desktop systems by leveraging light-weight virtualization and providing cooperative fea-
tures that reduce the number of security decisions made by the user at runtime. The work
leaves open some important avenues for further improvements that are discussed in the
following section.
6.1 Future Work
Possible avenues for future work on FlexICon include:
• Exploring ideas for creating the policy. For example, one could have a template
policy that can be customized for every user through a tool that asks the user about
his/her frequently visited websites in pre-defined categories. Alternatively, a learning
method could be used to gather information about user’s web activities to customize
the template policy based on the gathered data.
• Devising an automated tool for identifying domain names that collectively form a
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website. Such a tool can be used for defining the list of allowed domains for web-
based containers.
• Further dividing each web-based container so that the browser runs in its own sub-
container separate from other applications. This will help minimize the risk of ma-
licious code interfering with browser operation including modification to browser
network settings.
• Improving the implementation of FlexICon by:
– Preventing association of domain names to private IP addresses which could be
used in DNS rebinding attacks to gain access to unprotected local web consoles.
– Implementing rate-limiting mechanism in the URL handling module to prevent
compromised containers from opening too many URLs.
– Implementing sound support in containers.
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APPENDIX A
SAMPLE FLEXICON POLICY
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The following is a sample FlexICon configuration file that defines the following con-
tainers:
• Banking: dedicated to online banking
• Shopping: dedicated to online shopping
• Internet: for general Internet browsing
• User: for running certain applications when launched directly
• FileBrowser: for running the file browser application
• Junk: for running untrusted applications
• Email: for running the email client
• EmailDisposable: for opening email attachments
Note that the provided configuration is meant as an illustrative example, but it can be
extended for real use by including more applications, domain names and URLs.
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# Define application paths
define FIREFOX ”/usr/bin/firefox”
define KATE ”/usr/bin/kate”
define DOLPHIN ”/usr/bin/dolphin”
define KMAIL ”/usr/bin/kmail”
define BROWSERS { + FIREFOX, - ”*” }
# Domains needed for the Banking container
define BANKING_DOMAINS [
”[*.]usbank.com”,
”[*.]bankofamerica.com”,
”[*.]bac-assets.com”
]
# Banking websites
define BANKING_URLS [
”^://[^.]usbank.com[/*]”,
”^://[^.]bankofamerica.com[/*]”
]
# Domains needed for the Shopping container
define SHOPPING_DOMAINS [
”[*.]amazon.com”,
”[*.]awsstatic.com”,
”[*.]images-amazon.com”,
”[*-]images-amazon.com”,
”[*.]target.com”,
”[*.]targetimg1.com”,
”[*.]targetimg2.com”,
”[*.]targetimg3.com”,
”[*.]bestbuy.com”,
”[*.]bbystatic.com”,
”[*.]bby.com”
]
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# Shopping websites
define SHOPPING_URLS [
”^://[^.]amazon.com[/*]”,
”^://[^.]target.com[/*]”,
”^://[^.]bestbuy.com[/*]”
]
# Certificate authorities and other common domains
define COMMON_DOMAINS [
”[*.]verisign.com”,
”[*.]comodo.com”,
”[*.]digicert.com”,
”[*.]entrust.net”,
”[*.]globalsign.com”,
”[*.]sb-ssl.google.com”,
”[*.]akamaiedge.net”,
”[*.]edgekey.net”,
”[*.]amazonaws.com”,
”[*.]demdex.net”,
”[*.]cloudfront.net”,
”[*.]akamai.net”,
”[*.]symcd.com”
]
define ANY { + ”*” }
define ALL { + ”*” }
define NONE { - ”*” }
# Container definitions
container ”Banking” {
color_index: 4
gui: true
system_files: normal
home_extras: []
save_as_other_containers: []
read_from_other_containers: []
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network_access: true
domains: {
+ COMMON_DOMAINS,
+ BANKING_DOMAINS,
- ”*”
}
usr_bin: ALL
}
container ”Shopping” {
color_index: 3
gui: true
system_files: normal
home_extras: []
save_as_other_containers: []
read_from_other_containers: []
network_access: true
domains: {
+ COMMON_DOMAINS,
+ SHOPPING_DOMAINS,
- ”*”
}
usr_bin: ALL
}
container ”Internet” {
color_index: 1
gui: true
system_files: normal
home_extras: []
save_as_other_containers: []
read_from_other_containers: []
network_access: true
domains: {
- BANKING_DOMAINS,
- SHOPPING_DOMAINS,
+ ”*”
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}usr_bin: ALL
}
container ”User” {
color_index: 8
gui: true
system_files: normal
home_extras: []
save_as_other_containers: [
”Internet”,
”Banking”,
”Shopping”
]
read_from_other_containers: []
network_access: false
domains: NONE
usr_bin: ALL
}
container ”FileBrowser” {
color_index: 6
gui: true
system_files: normal
home_extras: [
”/Banking”,
”/Shopping”,
”/Internet”,
”/User”,
”/Junk”
]
save_as_other_containers: []
read_from_other_containers: []
network_access: false
domains: NONE
usr_bin: {
# Prevent these apps from executing in FileBrowser,
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# so that when the user clicks a text or PDF file
# in dolphin, it is opened in the proper container.
- ”kate”,
- ”okular”,
+ ”*”
}
}
# Junk container is used to execute untrusted apps
container ”Junk” {
color_index: 1
gui: true
system_files: normal
home_extras: []
save_as_other_containers: []
read_from_other_containers: []
network_access: false
domains: NONE
usr_bin: ALL
}
container ”Email” {
color_index: 5
gui: true
system_files: normal
home_extras: []
save_as_other_containers: []
read_from_other_containers: [
”Banking”,
”Shopping”,
”Internet”,
”User”
]
network_access: true
domains: ALL
usr_bin: {
- ”kate”,
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- ”okular”,
- ”firefox”,
+ ”*”
}
}
# EmailDisposable is used to open email attachment files
disposable ”EmailDisposable” {
color_index: 1
gui: true
system_files: normal
home_extras: []
save_as_other_containers: []
read_from_other_containers: []
network_access: false
domains: NONE
usr_bin: ALL
}
# Rules
# Run the Dolphin file browser in FileBrowser
if {
application {
+ DOLPHIN,
- ”*”
}
} then ”FileBrowser”
# Run KMail in Email
if {
application {
+ KMAIL,
- ”*”
}
} then ”Email”
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# Open Banking websites in Banking
if {
application BROWSERS
url {
+ BANKING_URLS,
- ”*”
}
} then ”Banking”
# Open Banking files in Banking
if {
application ANY
file {
+ ”/Banking/*”,
- ”*”
}
} then ”Banking”
# Open Shopping websites in Shopping
if {
application BROWSERS
url {
+ SHOPPING_URLS,
- ”*”
}
} then ”Shopping”
# Open Shopping files in Shopping
if {
application ANY
file {
+ ”/Shopping/*”,
- ”*”
}
} then ”Shopping”
# Open other websites in Internet
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if {
application BROWSERS
url {
- BANKING_URLS,
- SHOPPING_URLS,
+ ”*”
}
} then ”Internet”
# Open Internet files in Internet
if {
application ANY
file {
+ ”/Internet/*”,
- ”*”
}
} then ”Internet”
# Open User files in User
if {
application ANY
file {
+ ”/User/*”,
- ”*”
}
} then ”User”
# Open Junk files in Junk
if {
application ANY
file {
+ ”/Junk/*”,
- ”*”
}
} then ”Junk”
# Open Email files in EmailDisposable
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if {
application ANY
file {
+ ”/Email/*”,
- ”*”
}
} then ”EmailDisposable”
# Browsers launched directly should be opened in Internet
if { application BROWSERS } then ”Internet”
# Certain apps launched directly should be opened in User
if {
application {
+ KATE,
- ”*”
}
} then ”User”
# Any other applications should be opened in Junk
if { application ANY } then ”Junk”
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